Censored and Fair Universal Representations using Generative Adversarial
  Models by Kairouz, Peter et al.
Learning Generative Adversarial Representations under Fairness
and Censoring Constraints
Jiachun Liao Chong Huang Peter Kairouz Lalitha Sankar
Abstract
We present Generative Adversarial rePresentations (GAP) as a data-driven framework for
learning censored and/or fair representations. GAP leverages recent advancements in adver-
sarial learning to allow a data holder to learn universal representations that decouple a set of
sensitive attributes from the rest of the dataset. Under GAP, finding the optimal fair/censoring
encoder is formulated as a constrained minimax game between a data encoder and an adversary.
We show that for appropriately chosen adversarial loss functions, GAP provides censoring guar-
antees against strong information-theoretic adversaries and enforces demographic parity. We
also evaluate the performance of GAP on multi-dimensional Gaussian mixture models and real
datasets, and show how a designer can certify that representations learned under an adversary
with a fixed architecture perform well against more complex adversaries.
Keywords: Data censoring, Fairness, Adversarial Learning, Generative Adversarial Networks,
Minimax Games, Information Theory
1 Introduction
The use of deep learning algorithms for data analytics has recently seen unprecedented success
for a variety of problems such as image classification, natural language processing, and prediction
of consumer behavior, electricity use, political preferences, to name a few. The success of these
algorithms hinges on the availability of large datasets, that often contain sensitive information, and
thus, may facilitate learning models that inherit societal biases leading to unintended algorithmic
discrimination on legally protected groups such as race or gender. This, in turn, has led to data-
censoring and fairness concerns and a growing body of research focused on developing representations
of the dataset with fairness and/or censoring guarantees. These techniques predominantly involve
designing randomizing schemes, and in recent years, distinct approaches with provable statistical
censoring or fairness guarantees have emerged.
In the context of privacy, preserving the utility of published datasets while simultaneously pro-
viding provable privacy guarantees is a well-known challenge. While context-free privacy solutions,
such as differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006b,a, Dwork, 2008, Dwork and Roth, 2014], provide
strong worst-case privacy guarantees, they often lead to a significant reduction in utility. In con-
trast, context-aware privacy solutions, e.g., mutual information privacy [Rebollo-Monedero et al.,
2010, Calmon and Fawaz, 2012, Sankar et al., 2013, Salamatian et al., 2015, Basciftci et al., 2016],
achieve improved privacy-utility tradeoff, but assume that the data holder has access to dataset
statistics.
In the context of fairness, machine learning models seek to maximize predictive accuracy. Fair-
ness concerns arise when models learned from datasets that include patterns of societal bias and
discrimination inherit such biases. Thus, there is a need for actively decorrelating sensitive and
non-sensitive data. In the context of publishing datasets or meaningful representations that can be
“universally” used for a variety of learning tasks, modifying the training data is the most appropriate
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and is the focus of this work. Fairness can then be achieved by carefully designing objective func-
tions which approximate a specific fairness definition while simultaneously ensuring maximal utility
[Zemel et al., 2013, Calmon et al., 2017, Ghassami et al., 2018]. This, in turn, requires dataset
statistics.
Adversarial learning approaches for context-aware censoring and fairness have been studied
extensively [Edwards and Storkey, 2015, Abadi and Andersen, 2016, Raval et al., 2017, Huang
et al., 2017, Tripathy et al., 2017, Beutel et al., 2017, Madras et al., 2018b, Zhang et al., 2018]. They
allow the data curator to cleverly decorrelate the sensitive attributes from the rest of the dataset.
These approaches overcome the lack of statistical knowledge by taking a data-driven approach that
leverages recent advancements in generative adversarial networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al., 2014,
Mirza and Osindero, 2014]. However, most existing efforts focus on extensive empirical studies
without theoretical verification and focus predominantly on providing guarantees for a specific
classification task.
Figure 1: Generative adversarial model for privacy and fairness
1.1 Our Contributions.
This work introduces a general framework for context-aware censoring and fairness that we call
generative adversarial representation (GAP) (see Figure 1). We provide precise connections to
information-theoretic censoring and fairness formulations and derive game-theoretically optimal
decorrelation schemes to compare against those learned directly from the data. While our frame-
work can be generalized to learn an arbitrary representation using an encoder-decoder structure,
this paper primarily focuses on learning censored/fair representations of the data (of the same
dimension). We list our main contributions below.
When publishing a useful representation of the data for different learning tasks, it can be difficult
to identify a set of target variables (labels) a priori. GAP allows us to publish representations that do
not explicitly capture these downstream learning tasks. Instead, it ensures that the representation is
close enough to the original data in some metric space thus ensuring good accuracy on downstream
tasks for one or more non-sensitive labels.
1. We introduce GAP as a data-driven framework for creating fair and censored representations of
data using an adversarially trained conditional generative model. Unlike existing works[Edwards
and Storkey, 2016, Madras et al., 2018a, Chen et al., 2019], GAP can exploit different models (e.g.,
Figure 2) to create representations that are useful for a variety of classification and regression
tasks, without requiring the designer to model these tasks at training time. We validate this
observation via experiments on the GENKI [Whitehill and Movellan, 2012], HAR [Anguita et al.,
2013], UCI, and UTK datasets using the two GAP architectures presented on the left of Figure 2.
2. We show that via the choice of the adversarial loss function, our framework can capture a
rich class of statistical and information-theoretic adversaries. This allows us to compare data-
driven approaches directly against strong inferential adversaries (e.g., a maximum a posteriori
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probability (MAP) adversary with access to dataset statistics). We also show that by carefully
designing the loss functions in the GAP framework, we can enforce demographic parity.
3. We make precise comparison between data-driven censoring/fairness methods and the minimax
game-theoretic GAP formulation. For Gaussian mixture data, we derive game-theoretically opti-
mal decorrelation schemes and compare them with those that are directly learned in a data-driven
fashion to show that the gap between theory and practice is negligible. Furthermore, we propose
using mutual information estimators to verify that no adversary (regardless of their computa-
tional power) can reliably infer the sensitive attribute from the learned representation.
4. We have provided a novel definition of censored representation and generalize the definition of
demographic parity to representations, and therefore, generalize it to multiple/non-binary sensi-
tive and label settings. By applying the GAP framework to datasets with non-binary sensitive
features [Creager et al., 2019] (HAR,UCI Adult) and non-binary non-sensitive labels (UTK). We
show the flexibility of GAP in hiding multiple sensitive features and preserving utilities of multi-
ple applications. This is new in highlighting the generality of applying frequently used measures
of fairness such as demographic parity to non-binary sensitive and label settings.
Neural 
network
Neural 
network
(a) (b)
(c)
 Autoencoder
(d)
probabilistic transition 
matrix
Figure 2: Different architectures of data processor (encoder) for GAP.
1.2 Related Work
In the context of publishing datasets with censoring and utility guarantees, a number of similar
approaches have been recently considered. We briefly review them and clarify how our work is
different. DP-based obfuscators for data publishing have been considered in [Hamm, 2016, Liu
et al., 2017]. The author in [Hamm, 2016] considers a deterministic, compressive mapping of the
input data with differentially private noise added either before or after the mapping. The approach
in [Liu et al., 2017] relies on using deep auto-encoders to determine the relevant feature space to add
differentially private noise, thereby eliminating the need to add noise to the original data. These
novel approaches leverage minimax filters and deep auto-encoders to allow non-malicious entities to
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learn some public features from the filtered data, while preventing malicious entities from learning
other sensitive features. Both approaches incorporate a notion of context-aware privacy and achieve
better privacy-utility tradeoffs while using DP to enforce privacy. However, DP can still incur a
significant utility loss since it assumes worst-case dataset statistics. Our approach models a rich
class of randomization-based schemes via a generative model that allows the generative decorrelator
to tailor the noise to the dataset.
Our work is closely related to adversarial neural cryptography [Abadi and Andersen, 2016],
learning censored representations [Edwards and Storkey, 2015], privacy preserving image sharing
[Raval et al., 2017], privacy-preserving adversarial networks [Tripathy et al., 2017], and adversarially
learning fair representation [Madras et al., 2018b] in which adversarial learning is used to learn
how to protect communications by encryption or hide/remove sensitive information or generate fair
representation of the data. Similar to these problems, our model includes a minimax formulation and
uses adversarial neural networks to learn decorrelation schemes. However, in [Edwards and Storkey,
2015, Raval et al., 2017, Madras et al., 2018b], the authors use non-generative auto-encoders to
remove sensitive information. Instead, we use a GANs-like approach to learn decorrelation schemes
that prevent an adversary from inferring the sensitive variable. Furthermore, these formulations uses
weighted combination of different loss functions to balance privacy with utility. We also go beyond
in formulating a game-theoretic setting subject to a distortion constraint. These approaches are not
equivalent because of the non-convexity (resp. concavity) of the minimax problem with respect to
the decorrelator (resp. adversary) neural network parameters and requires new methods to enforce
the distortion constraint during the training process. The distortion constraint allows us to directly
limit the amount of distortion added to learn the private/fair representation for a variety of learning
tasks, which is crucial for preserving the utility of the learned representation. Moreover, we compare
the performance of the decorrelation schemes learned in an adversarial fashion with the game-
theoretically optimal ones for canonical synthetic data models thereby providing formal verification
of decorrelation schemes that are learned by competing against computational adversaries. Finally,
we propose using mutual information as a criterion to certify that the representations we learned
adversarially against an attacker with a fixed architecture generalize against unseen attackers with
(possibly) more complex architecture.
Fair representations using information-theoretic objective functions and constrained optimiza-
tion have been proposed in [Calmon et al., 2017, Ghassami et al., 2018]. However, both approaches
require the knowledge of dataset statistics, which are very difficult to obtain for real datasets. We
overcome the issue of statistical knowledge by taking a data-driven approach, i.e., learning the rep-
resentation from the data directly via adversarial models. In contrast to in-processing approaches
that modify learning algorithms to ensure fair predictions (e..g, using linear programs in [Dwork
et al., 2012, Fish et al., 2016] or via adversarial learning approach in [Zhang et al., 2018]), we focus
on a pre-processing approach to ensure fairness for a variety of learning tasks.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) have recently received a lot of attention in the machine
learning community [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Mirza and Osindero, 2014]. Ultimately, deep genera-
tive models hold the promise of discovering and efficiently internalizing the statistics of the target
signal to be generated. Using GANs to generate synthetic non-sensitive attributes and labels which
ensure fairness while preserving the utility of the data (predicting the label) has been studied in
[Xu et al., 2018, Sattigeri et al., 2018]. The goal here is to develop a conditional GAN-based model
to ensure fairness in the system by learning to generate a fairer synthetic dataset using an uncon-
strained minimax game with carefully designed loss functions corresponding with both fairness and
utility. The synthetic data is generated by a conditional generative adversarial network (GAN)
which generates the non-sensitive attributes-label pair given the noise variable and the sensitive
attribute. The utility is preserved by generating data that is very similar to the original data. To
ensure fairness, the generator generates data samples such that an auxiliary classifier trained to
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predict the sensitive attribute from the synthetic data performs as poorly as possible. The methods
presented in these papers are very different from our method since we are focusing on creating a
fair/private representations of the original data while preserving the utility of the representation for
a variety of learning tasks. There are different ways for enforcing fairness, and our work presents a
framework that aids in achieving this goal. More work is needed to be done in this area.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We formally defined censored and fair repre-
sentations in Section 2. In Section 3, we formalize our GAP model and highlight the theoretical
guarantees of this approach. In Section 4, we present theoretical results for datasets modeled as
multi-dimensional Gaussian mixtures. Finally, we showcase the performance of GAP on the GENKI,
HAR, UCI Adult, and UTKFace datasets in Section 5. All proofs and algorithms are deferred to
appendices in the accompanying supplementary materials.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a dataset D with n entries where each entry is denoted as (S,X, Y ) where S ∈ S is
a collection of sensitive features, X ∈ X is a collection of non-sensitive features, and Y ∈ Y is the
collection of target (non-sensitive) features to be learned. Let Yˆ ∈ Y be a prediction of Y . We
note that S, X, and Y can be a collection of features or labels (e.g., S can be gender, race, and
sexual orientation, while Y could be age, facial expression, etc.); for ease of writing, we use the term
variable to denote both single and multiple features/labels.
Instances of X, S, and Y are denoted by x, s and y, respectively. We assume that each entry
(X,S, Y ) is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to P (X,S, Y ).
Recent results on fairness in learning applications guarantees that for a specific target variable,
the prediction of a machine learning model is accurate with respect to (w.r.t.) the target variable
but unbiased w.r.t. a sensitive variable. The three oft-used fairness measures are demographic
parity, equalized odds, and equality of opportunity. Demographic parity imposes the strongest
fairness requirement via complete independence of the prediction of the target variable and sensitive
variable, and thus, least favors (for correlated target and sensitive variables) utility [Hardt et al.,
2016]. Equalized odds ensures this independence conditioned on the target variable thereby ensuring
equal rates for true and false positives (wherein the target variable is binary) for all demographics.
Equal opportunity ensures equalized odds for the true positive case alone [Hardt et al., 2016].
For the sake of completeness, we review these definitions briefly. We note that these definitions
are often aimed at sensitive (S) and target (Y ) features that are binary, and in reviewing these
definitions below, we make this assumption too. However, we note that these definitions can be
generalized to the non-binary setting; indeed, our own generalizations of these definitions as applied
to representation setting do not make such an assumption.
Definition 1 ([Hardt et al., 2016]) A predictor f(S,X) = Yˆ satisfies
• demographic parity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S, if Yˆ and S are independent, i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 1) = Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 0) (1)
• equalized odds w.r.t. the sensitive variable S and target variable Y , if Yˆ and S are independent
conditional on Y , i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 1, Y = y) = Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 0, Y = y), y ∈ {0, 1} (2)
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• equality of opportunity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S and target variable Y , if Yˆ and S are
independent conditional on Y = 1, i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 1, Y = 1) = Pr(Yˆ = 1|S = 0, Y = 1). (3)
We begin by first defining the notions of censoring and fairness for representations. In particular,
as discussed thus far, in the censoring context, our goal is to introduce a definition that ensures that
the censored representation limits leakage of sensitive variables from adversaries that can potentially
learn it from the released data. It is crucial to note that censoring will in general not give the kind of
strong privacy guarantees provided by differential privacy but can be relevant for some applications
where releasing a representation is crucial.
Definition 2 (Censored Representations) A representation Xr of X is censored w.r.t. the sen-
sitive variable S against a learning adversary h(·), whose performance is evaluated via a loss function
`(h(Xr), S), if for an optimal adversarial strategy h∗g = argminh E[`(h(g(X)), S)] corresponding to
any (randomized) function g(X)
E[`(h∗g(g(X)), S)] ≤ E[`(h∗g∗(Xr), S)], (4)
where Xr = g∗(X) and the expectation is over h, g, X, and S.
To motivate the generation of fair representations, we now extend the definition of demographic
parity for representations. Indeed it is known that fair representations can be used to ensure fair
classification (see, for example, [Hardt et al., 2016]). We formally define fair representation and
prove that such representations ensure fair classification.
Definition 3 (Fair Representations) Let Xr and S be the supports of Xr and S, respectively. A
representation Xr of X satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S if Xr and S are
independent, i.e., for any xr ∈ Xr and s, s′ ∈ S,
Pr(Xr = xr|S = s) = Pr(Xr = xr|S = s′). (5)
Given this definition, we now prove that a fair representation in the sense of demographic parity
will guarantee that any downstream learning algorithm making use of the fair representation is fair
(in the sense of demographic parity) w.r.t. the sensitive label S.
Theorem 1 (Fair Learning via Fair Representation) Given a dataset consisting of sensitive,
non-sensitive, and target variables (S,X, Y ), respectively, if a fair representation Xr = g(X) satisfies
demographic parity w.r.t. S, then any learning algorithm f : Xr → Y satisfies demographic parity
w.r.t. S.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A.
Remark 1 Note that the definitions of equalized odds and equality of opportunity in Def. 1 explicitly
involve a downstream learning application, and therefore, the design of a fair representation needs to
include a classifier explicitly. In contrast to the universal representation setting considered here, such
targeted representations and the ensuing fair classifiers provide guarantees only for those targeted
Y features. In this limited context, however, one can still define a representation Xr as ensuring
equalized odds (w.r.t. to S) in classifying Y if the predicted output learned from Xr, i.e., Yˆ (Xr), is
independent of S conditioned on Y .
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One simple approach to obtain a fair/censored representation Xr is by choosing Xr = N where
N is a random variable independent of X and S. However, such an Xr has no downstream utility
(quantified, for example, via downstream task accuracy). More generally, the design of Xr has to
ensure utility, and thus, there is a tradeoff between guaranteeing fairness/censoring and assuring a
desired level of utility. GAP enables quantifying these tradeoffs formally as described in the next
section.
3 Generative Adversarial Representations
Formally, GAP involves two components, an encoder and an adversary as shown in Fig. 1. The
goal of the encoder g : X × S → Xr is to actively decorrelate S from X while that of the adversary
h : Xr → S is to infer S. Thus, in general, g(X,S) is a randomized mapping that outputs a
representation Xr = g(X,S). Note that the design of g(·) depends on both X and S; however, we
note that S may not necessarily be an input to the encoder though it will always affect the design
of g(·) via the adversarial training process. In contrast, the role of the adversary is captured via
h(Xr), the adversarial decision rule (classifier) in inferring the sensitive variable S as Sˆ = h(g(X))
from the representation g(X,S). In general, the hypothesis h can be a hard decision rule under
which h(g(X)) is a direct estimate of S or a soft decision rule under which h(g(X)) = Ph(·|g(X))
is a distribution over S.
To quantify the adversary’s performance, we use a loss function `(h(g(X = x)), S = s) defined for
every pair (x, s). Thus, the adversary’s expected loss w.r.t. X and S is L(h, g) , E[`(h(g(X)), S)],
where the expectation is taken over P (X,S) and the randomness in g and h.
Intuitively, the generative (since it randomizes to decorrelate) encoder would like to minimize
the adversary’s ability to learn S reliably from Xr. This can be trivially achieved by releasing an
Xr independent of X. However, such an approach provides no utility for data analysts who want
to learn non-sensitive variables Y from Xr. To overcome this issue, we capture the loss incurred by
perturbing the original data via a distortion function d(xr, x), which measures how far the original
data X = x is from the processed data Xr = xr. Ensuring statistical utility in turn requires
constraining the average distortion E[d(g(X), X)] where the expectation is taken over P (X,S) and
the randomness in g.
3.1 GAP: Framework and Theoretical Results
To publish a censored or fair representation Xr , the data curator wishes to learn an encoder g that
guarantees both censoring/fairness (in the sense that it is difficult for the adversary to learn S from
Xr) as well as utility (in the sense that it does not distort the original data too much). In contrast,
for a fixed encoder g, the adversary would like to find a (potentially randomized) function h that
minimizes its expected loss, which is equivalent to maximizing the negative of the expected loss.
This leads to a constrained minimax game between the encoder and the adversary given by
min
g(·)
max
h(·)
− E[`(h(g(X));S)], (6a)
s.t. E[d(g(X), X)] ≤ D. (6b)
where the constant D ≥ 0 determines the allowable distortion of the representation and the expec-
tation is taken over P (X,S) and the randomness in g and h.
Theorem 2 For sufficiently large distortion bound D, the constrained minimax optimization in (6)
generates a GAP Xr that is censored w.r.t. to S.
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Loss function
`(h(g(X)), s)
Optimal adversarial
strategy h∗ Adversary type
Squared loss (h(g(X))− S)2 E[S|g(X)] MMSE adversary
0-1 loss
{
0 if h(g(X)) = S
1 otherwise argmaxs∈S
P (s|g(X)) MAP adversary
Log-loss log 1Ph(s|g(X)) P (s|g(X)) Belief refining adversary
α-loss αα−1
(
1− Ph(s|g(X))1− 1α
)
P (s|g(X))α∑
s∈S
P (s|g(X))α
Generalized belief
refining adversary
Table 1: GAP under various loss functions
Our GAP framework places no restrictions on the adversary. Indeed, different loss functions and
decision rules lead to different adversarial models (see Table 1). The versatility of GAP to a large
class of (inferring) adversarial models is captured by using the recently introduced tunable α-loss
function `(h(g(X)), s) = αα−1
(
1− Ph(s|g(X))1− 1α
)
, α ∈ [1,∞] [Liao et al., 2018]. The authors
in [Liao et al., 2018] show that by tuning the parameter α ∈ [1,∞], α-loss captures a variety of
information-theoretic adversaries ranging from a hard-decision adversary (for α = 1) via the 0-1
loss function `(h(g(X)), s) = Ih(g(X)) 6=s1 to a soft-decision adversary (for α = 1) under the log-
loss function `(h(g(X)), s) = − logPh(s|g(X)). Thus, for a given g(·), under α-loss, the optimal
adversarial strategy is given by the following proposition (also in the last row of Table 1).
Proposition 1 Under α-loss, the optimal adversary decision rule is a ‘α-tilted’ conditional distri-
bution P ∗h (s|g(X)) = P (s|g(X))
α∑
s∈S
P (s|g(X))α . The optimization in (6) reduces to ming(·)
−HAα (S|g(X)), where
HAα (·|·) is the Arimoto conditional entropy.
Note that for α = 1 and α =∞, the optimal adversarial strategies reduce to those for log-loss (third
row) and 0-1 loss (second row), respectively.
Corollary 1 Using α-loss, we can obtain a continuous interpolation between a hard-decision ad-
versary under 0-1 loss (α→∞) and a soft-decision adversary under log-loss function (α→ 1).
Note that under the hard-decision rules in which the adversary uses a 0-1 loss function, the op-
timal adversarial strategy is the maximum a posterior (MAP) decision rule and the GAP minimax
problem in (6) simplifies to ming(·) maxs∈S P (s, g(X))− 1. For a soft-decision adversary under log-
loss, the optimal adversarial strategy h∗ is P (S|g(X)) and the GAP minimax problem in (6) simpli-
fies to ming(·)−H(S|g(X)) = ming(·) I(g(X), S) for known prior of S subject to E[d(g(X), X)] ≤ D,
where I(g(X), S) is the mutual information (MI) between g(X) and S. Based on this observation,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Under α-loss (including log-loss and 0-1 loss), GAP enforces fairness subject to the
distortion constraint. As the distortion increases, the ensuing fairness guarantee approaches ideal
demographic parity.
The proofs of Theorem 2, Proposition 1 , Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 are presented in Appendix
B. Many notions of fairness rely on computing probabilities to ensure independence of sensitive and
1Note that for α = ∞, α-loss reduces to probability of error, for which the optimal adversarial strategy that
minimizes the expected loss is the maximal a posteriori (MAP) rule and the resulting probability of error is the 0-1
loss.
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target variables that are not easy to optimize in a data-driven fashion. In Theorem 3, we propose
α-loss (including log-loss modeled in practice via cross-entropy) in GAP as a proxy for enforcing
fairness.
A predominant approach in the literature in the context of representations and fairness is to
explicitly include the intended classification task, i.e., design representations for a specific learning
task. Our GAP formulation can be extended to include this special case. As one may expect, this
requires including an additional constraint to ensure high accuracy in learning Y thereby allowing
us to specialize (6) to obtain the following minimax game:
min
g′(·),f(·)
max
h(·)
− E[`(h(g′(X));S)] + λE[`′(f(g′(X)), Y )], (7a)
s.t. E[d(g′(X), X)] ≤ D, (7b)
where f(·) be a classifier for a target feature Y , λ > 0, and g′(·) and h(·) are the encoder and
the adversarial classifier, respectively, as in (6). Note that the loss functions `(·) and `′(·) can be
different. The transformation in (7) is more complicate than the GAP framework but produces a fair
classifier for the target feature and a fair representation, denoted by X ′r, for any other downstream
applications, simultaneously. We will evaluate the effect of incorporating a downstream application
by comparing the utility of the f(·) in (7) and a classifier generated by using Xr = g(·) in (6) for
the target feature.
In the GAP framework, we generate fair representations to guarantee fairness (in term of de-
mographic parity) in downstream applications for any subset of target features. Another common
method to provide fairness guarantee is to generate a fair predictor/classifier for the target vari-
able. We show the transformation of the GAP framework which designs a fair predictor/classifier
as follow.
Let Yˆ = g˜(S,X) be a predictor/classifier for the targeted variable Y . Note that the g˜(·) generally
depends on both X and S but the dependence on S can be implicit for scenarios where the sensitive
information S is not allowed to be used. Let h be a decision rule used by the adversary to infer the
sensitive variable S as Sˆ = h(g˜(S,X), Y ) from the true targeted variable Y and the soft information
of the predictor g˜(S,X) = PYˆ |X,S . Analogy to (6), the design of a fair predictor/classifier can be
formulated as
min
g˜(·)
max
h(·)
− E[`(h(g˜(S,X), Y ), S)], (8a)
s.t. E[`
(
g˜(S,X), Y
)
] ≤ L. (8b)
Proposition 2 Under α-loss (incorporating both log-loss and 0-1 loss), the GAP formulation in (8)
enforces fairness subject to the expected loss constraint. As the loss increases, the ensuing fairness
guarantee approaches ideal equalized odd of g˜ respect to the sensitive variable S and the targeted
variable Y .
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix B.5. Note that the formulation in (8) can also be used
to generate a fair predictor or classifier in term of demographic parity or equality of opportunity.
Specifically, for demographic parity, the adversary will only have g˜(S,X) as the input and for
equality of opportunity, the adversary will have both g˜(S,X) and Y = 1 as the input.
3.2 Data-driven GAP
Thus far, we have focused on a setting where the data holder has access to P (X,S). When P (X,S)
is known, the data holder can simply solve the constrained minimax optimization problem in (6)
(game-theoretic version of GAP) to obtain a decorrelation scheme that would perform best against a
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chosen type of adversary. In the absence of P (X,S), we propose a data-driven version of GAP that
allows the data holder to learn decorrelation schemes directly from a dataset D = {(x(i), s(i))}ni=1.
Under the data-driven version of GAP, we represent the decorrelation scheme via a generative
model g(X; θp) parameterized by θp. This generative model takes X as input and outputs Xr.
In the training phase, the data holder learns the optimal parameters θp by competing against a
computational adversary : a classifier modeled by a neural network h(g(X; θp); θa) parameterized
by θa. In the evaluation phase, the performance of the learned decorrelation scheme can be tested
under a strong adversary that is computationally unbounded and has access to dataset statistics.
We follow this procedure in the next section.
In theory, the functions h and g can be arbitrary. However, in practice, we need to restrict
them to a rich hypothesis class. Figure 1 shows an example of the GAP model in which the
generative decorrelator and adversary are modeled as deep neural networks. For a fixed h and
g, if S is binary, we can quantify the adversary’s empirical loss using cross entropy Ln(θp, θa) =
− 1n
n∑
i=1
s(i) log h(g(x(i); θp); θa) + (1 − s(i)) log(1 − h(g(x(i); θp); θa)). It is easy to generalize cross
entropy to the multi-class case using the softmax function. The optimal model parameters are the
solutions to
min
θp
max
θa
− Ln(θp, θa), s.t. ED[d(g(X; θp), X)] ≤ D, (9)
where the expectation is over D and the randomness in g.
The minimax optimization in (9) is a two-player non-cooperative game between the generative
decorrelator and the adversary with strategies θp and θa, respectively. In practice, we can learn
the equilibrium of the game using an iterative algorithm (see Algorithm 1 in Appendix C). We first
maximize the negative of the adversary’s loss function in the inner loop to compute the parameters
of h for a fixed g. Then, we minimize the decorrelator’s loss function, which is modeled as the
negative of the adversary’s loss function, to compute the parameters of g for a fixed h. Observe
that the distortion constraint in (9) makes our minimax problem different from what is extensively
studied in previous works. To incorporate the distortion constraint, we use the penalty method [Lillo
et al., 1993] to replace the constrained optimization problem by adding a penalty to the objective
function. The penalty consists of a penalty parameter ρt multiplied by a measure of violation of the
constraint at the tth iteration. The constrained optimization problem of the generative decorrelator
can be approximated by a series of unconstrained optimization problems with the loss function
Ln(θp, θa) + ρt(max{0,E[d(g(x(i); θp), x(i))]−D})2, where ρt is a penalty coefficient increases with
the number of iterations t. The algorithm and the penalty method are detailed in Appendix C.
4 GAP for Gaussian Mixture Models
In this section, we focus on a setting where S ∈ {0, 1} and X is an m-dimensional Gaussian mixture
random vector whose mean is dependent on S. Let P (S = 1) = q. Let X|S = 0 ∼ N (−µ,Σ)
and X|S = 1 ∼ N (µ,Σ), where µ = (µ1, ..., µm), and without loss of generality, we assume that
X|S = 0 and X|S = 1 have the same covariance Σ.
We consider a MAP adversary who has access to P (X,S) and the privacy mechanism. The
encoder’s goal is to sanitize X in a way that minimizes the adversary’s probability of correctly
inferring S from Xr. In order to have a tractable model for the encoder, we mainly focus on linear
(precisely affine) GAP Xr = g(X) = X + Z + β, where Z is an independently generated noise
vector. This linear GAP enables controlling both the mean and covariance of the privatized data.
To quantify utility of the privatized data, we use the `2 distance between X and Xr as a distortion
measure to obtain a distortion constraint EX,Xr‖X −Xr‖2 ≤ D.
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4.1 Game-Theoretical Approach
Consider the setup where both the encoder and the adversary have access to P (X,S). Further, let
Z be a zero-mean multi-dimensional Gaussian random vector. Although other distributions can be
considered, we choose additive Gaussian noise for tractability reasons.
Without loss of generality, we assume that β = (β1, ..., βm) is a constant parameter vector and
Z ∼ N (0,Σp). Following similar analysis in Gallager [2013], we can show that the adversary’s
probability of detection is given by
P
(G)
d = qQ
(
−α
2
+
1
α
ln
(
1− q
q
))
+ (1− q)Q
(
−α
2
− 1
α
ln
(
1− q
q
))
, (10)
where α =
√
(2µ)T (Σ + Σp)−12µ. Furthermore, since EX,Xr [d(Xr, X)] = EX,Xr‖X − Xr‖2 =
E‖Z + β‖2 = ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp), the distortion constraint implies that ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp) ≤ D. To make
the problem more tractable, we assume both X and Z are independent multi-dimensional Gaussian
random vectors with diagonal covariance matrices.
Theorem 4 Consider GAP given by g(X) = X + Z + β, where X|S and Z are multi-dimensional
Gaussian random vectors with diagonal covariance matrices Σ and Σp. Let {σ21, ..., σ2m} and {σ2p1 , ..., σ2pm}
be the diagonal entries of Σ and Σp, respectively. The parameters of the minimax optimal privacy
mechanism are
βi
∗ = 0, σ∗pi
2 =
(
|µi|√
λ∗0
− σ2i , 0
)+
,∀i = {1, 2, ...,m},
where λ∗0 is chosen such that
m∑
i=1
(
|µi|√
λ∗0
− σ2i
)+
= D. For this optimal mechanism, the accuracy of
the MAP adversary is given by (10) with α = 2
√√√√ m∑
i=1
µ2i
σ2i+
(
|µi|√
λ∗0
−σ2i
)+ .
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix C.1. We observe that the when σ2i is greater than
some threshold |µi|√
λ∗0
, no noise is added to the data on this dimension due to the high variance.
When σ2i is smaller than
|µi|√
λ∗0
, the amount of noise added to this dimension is proportional to |µi|;
this is intuitive since a large |µi| indicates the two conditionally Gaussian distributions are further
away on this dimension, and thus, distinguishable. Thus, more noise needs to be added in order to
reduce the MAP adversary’s inference accuracy.
4.2 Data-driven Approach
For the data-driven linear GAP, we assume the encoder only has access to the dataset D with n
data samples but not the actual distribution of (X,S). Computing the optimal privacy mechanism
becomes a learning problem. In the training phase, the data holder learns the parameters of the
GAP by competing against a computational adversary modeled by a multi-layer neural network.
When convergence is reached, we evaluate the performance of the learned mechanism by comparing
with the one obtained from the game-theoretic approach. To quantify the performance of the learned
GAP, we compute the accuracy of inferring S under a strong MAP adversary that has access to
both the joint distribution of (X,S) and the privacy mechanism.
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β0...
βm
σp0
...
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Xˆ
Z ∼ N (0,Σ1)
Figure 3: Neural network structure of linear GAP for Gaussian mixture data
Since the sensitive variable S is binary, we measure the training loss of the adversary network
by the empirical log-loss function
Ln(θp, θa) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
s(i) log h(g(x(i); θp); θa) + (1− s(i)) log(1− h(g(x(i); θp); θa)). (11)
For a fixed encoder parameter θp, the adversary learns the optimal θ∗a by maximizing (11). For
a fixed θa, the encoder learns the optimal θ∗p by minimizing −Ln(h(g(X; θp); θa), S) subject to the
distortion constraint EX,Xr‖X −Xr‖2 ≤ D.
As shown in Figure 3, the encoder is modeled by a two-layer neural network with parameters
θp = {β0, ..., βm, σp0, ..., σpm}, where βk and σpk represent the mean and standard deviation for
each dimension k ∈ {1, ...,m}, respectively. The random noise Z is drawn from a m-dimensional
independent zero-mean standard Gaussian distribution with covariance Σ1. Thus, we have Xˆk =
Xk + βk + σpkZk. The adversary, whose goal is to infer S from privatized data Xr, is modeled by a
three-layer neural network classifier with leaky ReLU activations.
To incorporate the distortion constraint into the learning process, we add a penalty term to the
objective of the encoder. Thus, the training loss function of the encoder is given by
L(θp, θa) = Ln(θp, θa) + ρmax{0, 1
n
n∑
i=1
d(g(x(i); θp), x(i))−D}, (12)
where ρ is a penalty coefficient which increases with the number of iterations. The added penalty
consists of a penalty parameter ρ multiplied by a measure of violation of the constraint. This
measure of violation is non-zero when the constraint is violated. Otherwise, it is zero.
4.3 Illustration of Results
We use synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance of the learned GAP. Each dataset contains
20K training samples and 2K test samples. Each data entry is sampled from an independent
multi-dimensional Gaussian mixture model. We consider two categories of synthetic datasets with
P (S = 1) equal to 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. Both the encoder and the adversary in the GAP
framework are trained on Tensorflow Abadi et al. [2016] using Adam optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.005 and a minibatch size of 1000. The distortion constraint is enforced by the penalty method
as detailed in supplement B (see (35)).
Figure 4 illustrates the performance of the learned GAP scheme against a strong theoretical
MAP adversary for a 32-dimensional Gaussian mixture model with P (S = 1) = 0.75 and 0.5. We
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observe that the inference accuracy of the MAP adversary decreases as the distortion increases
and asymptotically approaches (as expected) the prior on the sensitive variable. The decorrelation
scheme obtained via the data-driven approach performs very well when pitted against the MAP
adversary (maximum accuracy difference around 0.7% compared to the theoretical optimal). Fur-
thermore, the estimated mutual information decreases as the distortion increases. In other words,
for the data generated by Gaussian mixture model with binary sensitive variable, the data-driven
version of GAP can learn decorrelation schemes that perform as well as the decorrelation schemes
computed under the theoretical version of GAP, given that the generative decorrelator has access
to the statistics of the dataset.
(a) Sensitive variable classification accuracy (b) Estimated mutual information between S and
Xˆ
Figure 4: Performance of GAP for Gaussian mixture models
5 GAP for Real Datasets
We apply our GAP framework to real-world datasets to demonstrate its effectiveness in various
aspects:
• GENKI and HAR datasets are used to show the advantage of GAP in providing censoring
guarantee against a belief-refining adversary (captured by log-loss) who is interested in a
sensitive feature, e.g., gender or identities of individuals, and also to show the effectiveness of
the GAP framework on estimating mutual information.
• UCI Adult dataset2 is used to show the effectiveness of the GAP framework in approaching
demographic parity for both binary and non-binary sensitive features.
• UTKFace dataset3 is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the GAP framework in mul-
tiple downstream applications: including a non-binary classification of ethnicity and ordinal
regression of age.
In the experiments, we consider the first three different decorrelator architectures in Figure 2:
the feedforward neural network decorrelator (FNND), the transposed convolution neural network
decorrelator (TCNND) and the noisy autoencoder decorrelator (NoisyAED). The FNND architec-
ture (shown in Figure 2 (a)) uses a feedforward multi-layer neural network to combine the low-
dimensional random noise and the original data (i.e., X or (S,X)) together. The TCNND (shown
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
3http://aicip.eecs.utk.edu/wiki/UTKFace
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in Figure 2 (b)) takes a low-dimensional random noise and generates high-dimensional noise using a
multi-layer transposed convolution neural network. The generated high-dimensional noise is added
to the original data to produce the processed data (i.e., the representation Xr). The NoisyAED
(shown in Figure 2 (c)) uses the encoding part of an autoencoder to generate a lower-dimensional
feature vector of the original data and adds independent random noise to each element of the fea-
ture vector. The decoding part of the autoencoder reconvert the noise-adding feature vector to an
representation of the original data, i.e., the the processed data Xr. We apply both the FNND and
TCNND architectures to the GENKI dataset. For the UCI Adult and HAR datasets, we use the
FNND architecture, and the NoisyAED architecture is applied to the UTKFace dataset.
We use the accuracy of predicting a sensitive feature as the measure of censoring. For fairness,
given an arbitrary prediction Yˆ = y, demographic parity requires zero differences between the
conditional probabilities of Yˆ = y given different realizations of the sensitive feature S. We take
the maximal difference as the measure of demographic parity fairness, i.e.,
∆DemP(y) = max
s,s′∈S
|P (Yˆ = y|S = s)− P (Yˆ = y|S = s′)| (13)
and a smaller value of ∆DemP implies a better approximation of the demographic parity fairness.
We illustrate the results for each dataset mentioned above in the following subsections. Details of
all experiments on these datasets are in Appendix F.
5.1 Illustration of Results for GENKI Dataset
Figure 5a illustrates the gender classification accuracy of the adversary for different values of dis-
tortion. It can be seen that the adversary’s accuracy of classifying the sensitive variable (gender)
decreases progressively as the distortion increases. Given the same distortion value, FNND achieves
lower gender classification accuracy compared to TCNND. An intuitive explanation is that the
FNND uses both the noise vector and the original image to generate the processed image. However,
the TCNND generates the noise mask that is independent of the original image pixels and adds the
noise mask to the original image in the final step.
Differential privacy has emerged as the gold standard for data privacy. In this experiment,
we vary the variance of the Laplace and Gaussian noise to connect the noise adding mechanisms
to local differential privacy [Duchi et al., 2013, Kairouz et al., 2016]. In particular, we compute
the differential privacy guarantees provided by independent Laplace and Gaussian noise adding
mechanisms for different distortion values. The details are provided in Appendix E. In Table 2, we
observe that even if a huge amount of noise is added to each pixel of the image, the privacy risk ()
is still high. Furthermore, adding a huge noise deteriorates the expression classification accuracy.
(a) Gender vs. expression classification accuracy (b) Normalized mutual information estimation
Figure 5: CUT and mutual information estimation for GENKI
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Distortion D 1 2 3 4 5 100 1000
Laplace Mechanism

5792.61 4096 3344.36 2896.31 2590.53 579.26 183.17
Gaussian Mechanism
(δ = 10−6)

1918.24 1354.08 1107.57 959.18 857.76 191.82 60.66
Table 2: Differential privacy risk for different distortion values
Expression Original Data D = 1 D = 3 D = 5
Classification Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
False Positive Rate 0.04 0.14 0.1 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14
False Negative Rate 0.16 0.02 0.2 0.08 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.24
Table 3: Error rates for expression classification using representation learned by FNND
Expression Original Data D = 1 D = 3 D = 5
Classification Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
False Positive Rate 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.16
False Negative Rate 0.16 0.02 0.2 0.08 0.2 0.14 0.18 0.16
Table 4: Error rates for expression classification using representation learned by TCNND
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the learned GAP schemes, we compare the gender classi-
fication accuracy of the learned GAP schemes with adding uniform or Laplace noise. Figure 5a
shows that for the same distortion, the learned GAP schemes achieve much lower gender classifica-
tion accuracy than using uniform or Laplace noise. Furthermore, the estimated mutual information
Iˆ(Xˆ;S) normalized by Iˆ(X;S) also decreases as the distortion increases (Figure 5b).
To evaluate the influence of GAP on other non-sensitive variable (Y ) classification tasks, we
train another CNN (see Figure 18) to perform facial expression classification on datasets processed
by different decorrelation schemes. The trained model is then tested on the original test data. In
Figure 5a, we observe that the expression classification accuracy decreases gradually as the distortion
increases. Even for a large distortion value (5 per image), the expression classification accuracy only
decreases by 10%. Furthermore, the estimated normalized mutual information Iˆ(Xˆ;Y )/Iˆ(X;Y )
decreases much slower than Iˆ(Xˆ;S)/Iˆ(X;S) as the distortion increases (Figure 5b).
Table 3 and 4 present different error rates for the facial expression classifiers trained using
data representations created by different decorrelator architectures. We observe that as distortion
increases, the error rates difference for different sensitive groups decrease. This implies the classifier’s
decision is less biased to the sensitive variables when trained using the processed data. When D = 5,
the differences are already very small. Furthermore, we notice that the FNND architecture performs
better in enforcing fairness but suffers from higher error rate. The images processed by FNND is
shown in Figure 6. The decorrelator changes mostly eyes, nose, mouth, beard, and hair.
5.2 Illustration of Results for HAR Dataset
F.2 Figure 7a illustrates the activity and identity classification accuracy for different values of dis-
tortion. The adversary’s sensitive variable (identity) classification accuracy decreases progressively
as the distortion increases. When the distortion is small (D = 2), the adversary’s classification
accuracy is already around 27%. If we increase the distortion to 8, the classification accuracy
further decreases to 3.8%. Figure 7a depicts that even for a large distortion value (D = 8), the
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Figure 6: Perturbed images with different per pixel distortion using FNND
activity classification accuracy only decreases by 18% at most. Furthermore, Figure 7b shows that
the estimated normalized mutual information also decreases as the distortion increases.
(a) Identity vs. activity classification accuracy (b) Normalized mutual information estimation
Figure 7: Censoring/fairness-utility tradeoff and mutual information estimation for HAR
5.3 Illustration of Results for UCI Adult Dataset
For the UCI Adult dataset with both categorical and continuous features as shown in Table 5, we
consider two cases: (i) in Case I, the sensitive variable S is gender, which is either male or female,
and (ii) in Case II, the sensitive variable S is the couple of gender and relationship, which has 12
possibilities. In both cases, the target variable Y is salary, which is either > 50K or ≤ 50K. For
the binary target variable, the two values of the fair statistic ∆DemP in (13) are the same, and for
simplification, we use ∆DemP to indicate the value.
Case I: Binary Sensitive Feature.
Fig. 8 illustrates the censoring-utility tradeoff (CUT) and fairness-utility tradeoff (FUT) for the
GAP Xr generated under two scenarios: (i) the encoder g(·) of the original GAP framework in (6)
takes only the non-sensitive features X as the input and (2) the encoder g(·) in (6) takes both X
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Case I Feature Description Case II
Y salary 2-salary intervals: > 50K and ≤ 50K Y
S gender 2 classes: male and female
S
X
relationship 6 classes of family relationships (e.g., wife and husband)
age 9-age intervals: 18− 25, 25− 30, 30− 35, ...,60− 65
X
workclass 8 types of employer
education 16 levels of the highest achieved education
marital-status 7 classes of marital status
occupation 14 types of occupation
race 5 classes
native-country 41 countries of origin
capital-gain Recorded capital gain; (continuous)
capital-loss Recorded capital loss; (continuous)
hours-per-week Worked hours per week; (continuous)
education-num Numerical version of education; (continuous)
Table 5: Features of the UCI Adult dataset
and S as the input.
From Fig. 8a, we observe that: (i) while the classification accuracy of the sensitive variable
(gender) is about 66% and decreases about 20% from the baseline, i.e., accuracy obtained from
the original data, the classification accuracy of the target variable (salary) is above 82% and only
decreases 2.5% from its baseline. Note that 66% is probability of male in the original testing data
and indicates a random guess of gender. Therefore, the GAP Xr hides the information about gender
pretty well while maintains the information about salary; (ii) only in the high utility region, where
the accuracy of salary is no less than 72.5%, to take both S and X as the input of the encoder
g(·) have a small advantage over only feeding X into the encoder g(·). Specifically, given the same
accuracy of the sensitive variable (gender), the accuracy of the target variable (salary) is at most
0.3% higher. From this, we can know that gender is highly related to salary in this dataset and the
GAP framework is doing the right job by preferentially hiding the sensitive information gender.
From Fig. 8b, we observe that (i) as the accuracy of salary decreases, the fairness statistic
∆DemP becomes smaller. While the ∆DemP is almost 0, the accuracy of salary is above 79% and
the FUT of the GAP Xr has a linear relationship. Therefore, the GAP framework is effective to
approach perfect demographic parity; (ii) the GAP Xr generated from either X or (S,X) leads
to a similar FUT. Therefore, to generate Xr by feeding X or (S,X) into the encoder g(·) results
in similar censoring/fairness guarantee for given utility, which verifies that the GAP framework is
efficient in generating a censored/fair representation w.r.t. the sensitive feature gender.
Case II: Non-binary Sensitive Feature. Figs. 9 and 10 illustrate the censoring/fairness-
utility tradeoffs for Case II with both gender and relationship as the sensitive features.
Fig. 9 shows the CUTs of the GAP Xr in hiding gender and/or relationship while maintains
the information about salary. From Fig. 9, we observe that while the classification accuracy of
the target variable (salary) is above 79%, the classification accuracies of gender and/or relationship
are about 66% (as shown in Fig. 9a), 45% (as shown in Fig. 9b) and 41% (as shown in Fig. 9c),
respectively. Note that the probabilities of male, husband, and the combination (male, husband) is
66%, 40% and 40%, respectively, in the original testing data, and therefore, when the classification
accuracy of salary is about 79%, the corresponding classification accuracy for gender, relationship,
and combination (gender, relationship) indicate a random guess with known prior. Therefore, the
GAP Xr works pretty well in hiding multiple sensitive information separately or jointly. On the
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(a) CUT. (b) FUT.
Figure 8: Censoring/fairness-utility tradeoffs for Case I of UCI Adult. Note that in Fig. 8a we use
the classification accuracy for the original testing dataset (only using the non-sensitive feature X)
as the baseline. The green and red lines denote the baselines for the target variable (salary) and
the sensitive variable (gender), respectively; in Fig. 8b, the value of ∆DemP for the original testing
data is 0.2.
other hand, to have the flexibility of hiding the other sensitive information, i.e., relationship, the
cost is a reduce in utility for a given classification accuracy of gender. Compare the results in Figs.
8a and 9a, we can see that the drop of the classification accuracy of salary is at most 3% for any
given accuracy of gender. Note that in Figs., 8a and 9a, the baselines, i.e., the accuracy of salary
and gender, are different is because of the lack of relationship in the feature variable X for Case II
compared to Case I.
(a) CUT for Gender (b) CUT for relationship (c) CUT for (gender, relationship)
Figure 9: CUTs for Case II of UCI Adult. Note that we use the classification accuracy obtained
from the original testing dataset as the baseline, which is denoted by the green and red lines for the
target variable (salary) and the sensitive variable (gender or/and relationship), respectively.
Fig. 10 shows the FUTs of the GAP Xr in predicting salary. We observe that while the
classification accuracy of salary is above 94% of the baseline (i.e., 85.15% the accuracy for the
original testing dataset), the fairness statistic ∆DemP (defined in (13)) is dropped to 25% for gender
and about 34% for both relationship and the couple (relationship gender). Therefore, the GAP Xr
works well in decorrelating the information of salary and the information of gender and relationship
jointly and separately. From 10b, we observe that the value of ∆DemP for the couple (relationship,
gender) is almost the same as that for relationship. In addition, to compare the FUTs in Figs. 8b
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and 10b, we can see that for given classification accuracy of salary, the ∆DemP for gender in Case
II can be about 0.05 (about 25% of the baseline 0.2) larger than that in Case I, which is the cost of
providing fairness for relationship.
(a) FUT for gender. (b) FUT for relationship/ (relationship, gender).
Figure 10: FUTs for Case II of UCI Adult. Note that in Fig. 10b, the red and blue lines are the
fairness statistic ∆DemP for relationship and (gender, relationship), respectively. For the original
testing data, the value of ∆DemP for gender, relationship and (gender, relationship) is 0.2, 0.438
and 0.443 , respectively.
5.4 Illustration of Results for UTKFace Dataset
We generate the GAP Xr, which is decorrelated from gender (the sensitive feature), for face images
in the UTKFace dataset and show the effectiveness of Xr by illustrating its censoring/fairness-
utility tradeoffs in two downstream applications: ethnicity classification and age regression. For the
two application, the supports of the target variable Y are Y = {White, Black, Asian, Indian} and
Y = {i ∈ Z : 10 ≤ i ≤ 65} = [10, 65], respectively. We use the maximal value of the demographic
parity measure defined in (13), i.e., ∆DemP = maxy∈Y , as the fairness indicator.
Fig. 11 illustrates various-distorted GAP Xr for 16 typical faces in the UTKFace dataset. The
16 typical faces covers the 8 possible combination of 2 gender (male and female) and 4 ethnicity
(White, Black, Asian and Indian) and includes young, adult and old faces. From 11, we can observe
(i) for a small per-pixel distortion (e.g., 0.003), the distinguished features of gender like lipstick are
smoothed out in the GAP; and (ii) as a higher per-pixel distortion allowed (e.g., 0.006), the GAP
approaches a face with an opposite gender; (iii) however, when the per-pixel distortion is too large
(e.g., 0.01), the GAP tends to be too blurred to show the face contour and clear five sense organs.
Figs. 12a and 13 show the CUTs of the GAPXr for the ethnicity classification and age regression,
respectively. In Fig. 12a, while the classification accuracy of gender is about 62% and decreases
about 35% from the baseline, i.e., accuracy obtained from the original testing data, the classification
accuracy of ethnicity is above 74% and only decreases 14% from its baseline. Note that in the original
testing data, the highest marginal probability for gender and ethnicity are 54.6% (the probability of
male) and 43.2% (the probability of White), respectively. Therefore, the 62% classification accuracy
of gender is only better than a random guess by 7.4% while the 74% classification accuracy of
ethnicity is better than a random guess by 30.8%. Therefore, the GAP Xr hides the information
about gender well while maintains the information about salary. For age regression, we use the mean
absolute error (MAE), i.e., the average absolute difference between the predicted age and the true
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Figure 11: The GAP of face images under various per-pixel distortions for UTKFace. Note that the
distortion is the per pixel distortion.
age, as the utility measure. In Fig. 13a, we observe that while the classification accuracy for gender
is about 62%, which is 35% decrease from the baseline 94%, the increase in the MAE is 1.5 which
is about 20% increase from the baseline 7.2. Fig. 13a shows the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the difference between the true and predicted age for various distortions, from which we
can see that the drop of the cumulative probability is at most 1%. Therefore, the GAP also does a
good job in keeping the information about age and to limit the distortion of the representation is
an efficient way for guaranteeing utilities of various applications.
Figs. 12b and 14 show the FUTs of the GAP Xr in ethnicity classification and age regression,
respectively. In Fig. 12b, we observe that to achieve about 86% of the baseline, i.e., the classification
accuracy of ethnicity obtained from the original testing dataset, the GAP Xr reduces the ∆DemP,
the maximal value of the demographic parity measure (defined in (13)) over the four ethnicity, to
0.03 which is only 20% of the ∆DemP = 0.14 on the original testing data. Therefore, the GAP
does a good job in approaching demographic parity fairness while maintain the utility for ethnicity
classification. Table 6 shows the decrease of each of the demographic parity measure for the four
ethnicity as the distortion increases. In fig. 14a, while preserving 86% of the utility baseline, the
∆DemP, i.e., the maximal value of demographic parity measure over the 56 ages, to 0.015 which is
less than 33% of the ∆DemP = 0.046 on the original testing data. Fig. 14b shows the demographic
measure ∆DemP(y) , y ∈ [10, 65], for various distortions, from which we observe that when the pixel
distortion is 0.01, even though the ∆DemP = 0.015, for 17 different ages, ∆DemP(y) = 0. That is, the
prediction of these 17 different ages is completely independent of gender (the sensitive information)
and demographic parity is achieved for those predictions.
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(a) CUT. (b) FUT.
Figure 12: The tradeoffs for ethnicity classification on the UTKFace dataset. Note that in Fig. 12b,
the x-axis is the maximal value of demographic parity measure in (13) over the four ethnicity.
Distortion 0 0.003 0.0045 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.01
∆DemP(white) 0.061 0.055 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
∆DemP(black) 0.109 0.021 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
∆DemP(Asian) 0.14 0.082 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03
∆DemP(Indian) 0.031 0.006 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01
Table 6: The demographic parity fairness (indicated by ∆DemP(·)) of ethnicity classification on the
UTKFace dataset.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a novel adversarial learning framework for creating private/fair representations
of the data with verifiable guarantees. GAP allows the data holder to learn the decorrelation
scheme directly from the dataset (to be published) without requiring access to dataset statistics.
Under GAP, finding the optimal decorrelation scheme is formulated as a game between two players:
a generative decorrelator and an adversary. We have shown that for appropriately chosen loss
functions, GAP can provide guarantees against strong information-theoretic adversaries, such as
MAP and MI adversaries. It can also enforce fairness, quantified via demographic parity by using
the log-loss function. We have also validated the performance of GAP on Gaussian mixture models
and real datasets. There are several fundamental questions that we seek to address. An immediate
one is to develop techniques to rigorously benchmark data-driven results for large datasets against
computable theoretical guarantees. More broadly, it will be interesting to investigate the robustness
and convergence speed of the decorrelation schemes learned in a data-driven fashion. In this paper,
we connect our objective function in GAP with demographic parity. Since there is no single metric
for fairness, this leaves room for designing objective functions that link to other fairness metrics
such as equalized odds and equal opportunity.
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(a) CUT.
(b) The CDF of the difference between the true
and predicted age.
Figure 13: The tradeoffs and performance for age regression on the UTKFace dataset. Note that
the distortion is the per pixel distortion.
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(a) FUT. (b) The demographic parity measure for various
distortions.
Figure 14: The achieved fairness for age regression on the UTKFace dataset. Note that in Fig. 14a,
the x-axis is the maximal value of demographic parity measure in (13) over the 56 ages.
A Proof of Theorem 1
An encoder g(X) that satisfies demographic parity ensures that Xr is independent of S, i.e., the
mutual information I(S;Xr) = 0. Further, the downstream learning algorithm acts only on Xr to
predict Yˆ ; combining these, we have that, (S,X)−Xr− Yˆ form a Markov chain. From Definition 3,
since Xr is independent of S, I(S;Xr) = 0. From the data processing inequality and non-negativity
of mutual information, we have that,
0 ≤ I(S; Yˆ ) ≤ I(S;Xr) = 0. (14)
Therefore, S is independent of Yˆ , and thus, from Definition 1, Yˆ satisfies demographic parity w.r.t.
S.
Note that S can be collection of sensitive features. From the fact I(S;Xr) = 0 as well as the chain
rule and non-negativity of mutual information, we have I(Xr;St) = 0 for any subset of features
St ⊂ S. Therefore, Yˆ satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. any subset of features in S.
B Theoretical Results of GAP
Our GAP framework places no restrictions on the adversary. Indeed, different loss functions and
decision rules lead to different adversarial models. In what follows, we will discuss a variety of
loss functions under hard and soft decision rules, and show how our GAP framework provides
censoring guarantee against various adversaries. We will also show that we can obtain a continuous
interpolation between a hard-decision adversary under 0-1 loss function and a soft-decision adversary
under log-loss function using the α-loss function.
Hard Decision Rules. When the adversary adopts a hard decision rule, h(g(X)) is an
estimate of S. Under this setting, we can choose `(h(g(X)), S) in a variety of ways. For instance,
if S is continuous, the adversary can attempt to minimize the difference between the estimated and
true sensitive variable values. This can be achieved by considering a squared loss function
`(h(g(X)), S) = (h(g(X))− S)2, (15)
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which is known as the `2 loss. In this case, one can verify that the adversary’s optimal decision
rule is h∗ = E[S|g(X)], which is the conditional mean of S given g(X). Furthermore, under the
adversary’s optimal decision rule, the minimax problem in (6) simplifies to
min
g(·)
−mmse(S|g(X)) = −max
g(·)
mmse(S|g(X)),
subject to the distortion constraint. Here mmse(S|g(X)) is the resulting minimum mean square
error (MMSE) under h∗ = E[S|g(X)]. Thus, under the `2 loss, GAP provides censoring guarantees
against an MMSE adversary. On the other hand, when S is discrete (e.g., age, gender, political
affiliation, etc), the adversary can attempt to maximize its classification accuracy. This is achieved
by considering a 0-1 loss function [Nguyen and Sanner, 2013] given by
`(h(g(X)), S) =
{
0 if h(g(X)) = S
1 otherwise . (16)
In this case, one can verify that the adversary’s optimal decision rule is the maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) decision rule: h∗ = argmaxs∈S P (s|g(X)), with ties broken uniformly at random.
Moreover, under the MAP decision rule, the minimax problem in (6) reduces to
min
g(·)
−(1−max
s∈S
P (s, g(X))) = min
g(·)
max
s∈S
P (s, g(X))− 1, (17)
subject to the distortion constraint. Thus, under a 0-1 loss function, the GAP formulation provides
censoring guarantees against a MAP adversary.
Soft Decision Rules. Instead of a hard decision rule, we can also consider a broader class of
soft decision rules where h(g(X)) is a distribution over S; i.e., h(g(X)) = Ph(s|g(X)) for s ∈ S. In
this context, we can analyze the performance under a log-loss
`(h(g(X)), s) = log
1
Ph(s|g(X)) . (18)
In this case, the objective of the adversary simplifies to
max
h(·)
−E[log 1
Ph(s|g(X)) ] = −H(S|g(X)),
and that the maximization is attained at P ∗h (s|g(X)) = P (s|g(X)). Therefore, the optimal adver-
sarial decision rule is determined by the true conditional distribution P (s|g(X)), which we assume
is known to the data holder in the game-theoretic setting. Thus, under the log-loss function, the
minimax optimization problem in (6) reduces to
min
g(·)
−H(S|g(X)) = min
g(·)
I(g(X);S)−H(S),
subject to the distortion constraint. Thus, under the log-loss in (18), GAP is equivalent to using
MI as the privacy metric [Calmon and Fawaz, 2012].
The 0-1 loss captures a strong guessing adversary; in contrast, log-loss or information-loss models
a belief refining adversary.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
In (6), the output of the optimal encoder g∗(X) is the GAP of the original features X, i.e., Xr =
g∗(X) = argming(·) maxh(·)−E[`(h(g(X));S)]. Let h∗ be the corresponding optimal adversarial
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strategyi.e., h∗g∗ = argminh E[`(h(Xr), S)]. For sufficient large distortion bound D, Xr can be
arbitrarily distorted from X and g(·) can be any mapping from X to Xr. Therefore, we can get
ride of the distortion constraint in (6) and have
−E[`(h∗g∗(Xr);S)] =−max
g(·)
min
h(·)
E[`(h(g(X));S)] (19)
=−max
g(·)
E[`(h∗g(g(X));S)], (20)
≤− E[`(h∗g(g(X));S)], (21)
(22)
where g(X) is any (randomized) mapping of X. That is, the GAP Xr satisfies the inequality in
(4). Thus, for sufficiently large distortion bound D, the GAP Xr generated from the formulation in
(6) is censored w.r.t. the sensitive variable S against a learning adversary h(·) captured by a loss
function `(h(Xr), S).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the α-loss function [Liao et al., 2018]
`(h(g(X)), s) =
α
α− 1
(
1− Ph(s|g(X))1−
1
α
)
, (23)
for any α > 1. Denote HAα (S|g(X)) as the Arimoto conditional entropy of order α. Due to that
α-loss is convex in Ph(s|g(X)), by using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, we show that
max
h(·)
−E
[
α
α− 1
(
1− Ph(s|g(X))1−
1
α
)]
=
α
1− α
(
1− exp
(
1− α
α
HAα (S|g(X))
))
which is achieved by a ‘α-tilted’ conditional distribution
P ∗h (s|g(X)) =
P (s|g(X))α∑
s∈S
P (s|g(X))α .
Under this choice of a decision rule, the objective of the minimax optimization in (6) reduces to
min
g(·)
−HAα (S|g(X)). (24)
B.3 Proof of Corollary 1
For large α (α → ∞), this loss approaches that of the 0-1 (MAP) adversary in the limit. As α
decreases, the convexity of the loss function encourages the estimator Sˆ to be probabilistic, as it
increasingly rewards correct inferences of lesser and lesser likely outcomes (in contrast to a hard
decision rule by a MAP adversary of the most likely outcome) conditioned on the revealed data.
As α→ 1, (23) yields the logarithmic loss, and the optimal belief PSˆ is simply the posterior belief.
Therefore, using α-loss, we can obtain a continuous interpolation between a hard-decision adversary
under 0-1 loss (α→∞) and a soft-decision adversary under log-loss function (α→ 1).
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
For any fixed classifier g, the optimal adversarial strategy in (6) is
h?(g(X)) = arg max
h(·)
−E[`(h(g(X)), S)]. (25)
When α-loss is used, from Proposition. 1 we have that for α ≥ 1, the optimal adversarial strategy
is given by
h?(g(X), S) =
P (s|g(X))α∑
s′∈S
P (s′|g(X))α , (26)
for any s ∈ S, and the corresponding expected α-loss is given by
E
[
`
(
h(g(X)), S
)]
=
{
α
α−1
(
1− exp (1−αα HAα (S|g(X)))) , α > 1
H(S|g(X)), α = 1. (27)
Therefore, the optimization in (6) can be simplifies to
min
g(·)
−HAα (S|g(X)), (28a)
s.t. E[d
(
g(X), X
)
] ≤ D (28b)
where HAα (S|g(X)) is the Arimoto conditional entropy of order α. Note that as α tends to 1, it
simplifies to Shannon entropy [Verdu, ’15]. From the non-negativity of Arimoto mutual information,
we know that
HAα (S|g(X)) ≤ HAα (S) (29)
with equality if and only if g(X) is independent of S, which is exactly the requirement of demographic
parity. Thus, as the distortion bound D in (28) increases, the GAP formulation in (28) will approach
ideal demographic parity by enforcing HAα (S|g(X)) = HAα (S).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 2
For any fixed classifier g˜, the optimal adversarial strategy in (8) is
h?(g˜(S,X), Y ) = arg max
h(·)
−E[`(h(g˜(S,X), Y ), S)]. (30)
When α-loss is used, from Proposition. 1 we have that for α ≥ 1, the optimal adversarial strategy
is given by
h?(g˜(S,X), Y ) =
P (s|g˜(S,X), Y )α∑
s′∈S
P (s′|g˜(S,X), Y )α , (31)
for any s ∈ S, and the corresponding expected α-loss is given by
E
[
`
(
h(g˜(S,X), Y ), S
)]
=
{
α
α−1
(
1− exp (1−αα HAα (S|g˜(S,X), Y ))) , α > 1
H(S|g˜(S,X), Y ), α = 1. (32)
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Therefore, the optimization in (8) can be simplifies to
min
g˜(·)
−HAα (S|g˜(S,X), Y ), (33a)
s.t. E[`
(
g˜(S,X), Y
)
] ≤ L (33b)
where HAα (S|g˜(S,X), Y ) is the Arimoto conditional entropy of order α. Note that as α tends to 1,
it simplifies to Shannon entropy [Verdu, ’15].
From the non-negativity of Arimoto mutual information, we know that
HAα (S|g˜(S,X), Y ) ≤ HAα (S|Y ) (34)
with equality if and only if g˜(S,X) is independent of S conditioning on Y , which is exactly the
requirement of equalized odds. Thus, as the loss upper-bound L in (33) increases, the GAP for-
mulation in (33) will approach ideal equalized odds of g˜(S,X) respect to Y and S by enforcing
HAα (S|g˜(S,X), Y ) = HAα (S|Y ).
C Alternate Minimax Algorithm
In this section, we present the alternate minimax algorithm to learn the GAP scheme from a dataset.
The alternating minimax censoring preserving algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. To incorporate
the distortion constraint into the learning algorithm, we use the penalty method [Lillo et al., 1993]
and augmented Lagrangian method [Eckstein and Yao, 2012] to replace the constrained optimization
problem by a series of unconstrained problems whose solutions asymptotically converge to the
solution of the constrained problem. Under the penalty method, the unconstrained optimization
problem is formed by adding a penalty to the objective function. The added penalty consists of a
penalty parameter ρt multiplied by a measure of violation of the constraint. The measure of violation
is non-zero when the constraint is violated and is zero if the constraint is not violated. Therefore,
in Algorithm 1, the constrained optimization problem of the decorrelator can be approximated by
a series of unconstrained optimization problems with the loss function
`(θtp, θ
t+1
a ) =−
1
M
M∑
i=1
`(h(g(x(i); θ
t
p); θ
t+1
a ), s(i)) + ρt(max{0,
1
M
M∑
i=1
d(g(x(i); θ
t
p), x(i))−D})2,
(35)
where ρt is a penalty coefficient which increases with the number of iterations t. For convex opti-
mization problems, the solution to the series of unconstrained problems will eventually converge to
the solution of the original constrained problem [Lillo et al., 1993].
The augmented Lagrangian method is another approach to enforce equality constraints by
penalizing the objective function whenever the constraints are not satisfied. Different from the
penalty method, the augmented Lagrangian method combines the use of a Lagrange multiplier and
a quadratic penalty term. Note that this method is designed for equality constraints. Therefore,
we introduce a slack variable δ to convert the inequality distortion constraint into an equality con-
straint. Using the augmented Lagrangian method, the constrained optimization problem of the
decorrelator can be replaced by a series of unconstrained problems with the loss function given by
`(θtp, θ
t+1
a , δ) =−
1
M
M∑
i=1
`(h(g(x(i); θ
t
p); θ
t+1
a ), s(i)) +
ρt
2
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
d(g(x(i); θ
t
p), x(i)) + δ −D)2 (36)
− λt( 1
M
M∑
i=1
d(g(x(i); θ
t
p), x(i)) + δ −D),
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where ρt is a penalty coefficient which increases with the number of iterations t and λt is updated
according to the rule λt+1 = λt−ρt( 1M
M∑
i=1
d(g(x(i); θ
t
p), x(i))+δ−D). For convex optimization prob-
lems, the solution to the series of unconstrained problems formulated by the augmented Lagrangian
method also converges to the solution of the original constrained problem [Eckstein and Yao, 2012].
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Since EX,Xˆ [d(Xˆ,X)] = EX,Xˆ‖X − Xˆ‖2 = E‖Z + β‖2 = ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp), the distortion constraint
implies that ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp) ≤ D. Let us consider Xˆ = X +Z+β, where β ∈ R and Σp is a diagonal
covariance whose diagonal entries is given by {σ2p1 , ..., σ2pm}. Given the MAP adversary’s optimal
inference accuracy in (10), the objective of the decorrelator is to
min
β,Σp
P
(G)
d (37)
s.t. ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp) ≤ D.
Define 1−qq = η. The gradient of P
(G)
d w.r.t. α is given by
∂P
(G)
d
∂α
=p˜
(
− 1√
2pi
e−
(−α2 + 1α ln η)
2
2
)(
−1
2
− 1
α2
ln η
)
(38)
+ (1− p˜)
(
− 1√
2pi
e−
(−α2 − 1α ln η)
2
2
)(
−1
2
+
1
α2
ln η
)
=
1
2
√
2pi
(
p˜e−
(−α2 + 1α ln η)
2
2 + (1− p˜)e−
(−α2 − 1α ln η)
2
2
)
(39)
+
ln η
α2
√
2pi
(
p˜e−
(−α2 + 1α ln η)
2
2 − (1− p˜)e−
(−α2 − 1α ln η)
2
2
)
.
Note that
p˜e−
(−α2 + 1α ln η)
2
2
(1− p˜)e−
(−α2 − 1α ln η)
2
2
=
p˜
1− p˜ e
(−α2 − 1α ln η)
2−(−α2 + 1α ln η)
2
2 =
p˜
1− p˜ e
2 ln η
2 =
p˜
1− p˜ e
ln η = 1. (40)
Therefore, the second term in (39) is 0. Furthermore, the first term in (39) is always positive. Thus,
P
(G)
d is monotonically increasing in α. As a result, the optimization problem in (37) is equivalent
to
min
β,Σp
(2µ)T (Σ + Σp)
−12µ (41)
s.t. ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp) ≤ D.
The objective function in (41) can be written as
2
[
µ1 µ2 . . . µm
]

1
σ21+σ
2
p1
0 . . . 0
0 1
σ22+σ
2
p2
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1
σ2m+σ
2
pm
 2

µ1
µ2
...
µm
 =
m∑
i=1
4µ2i
σ2i + σ
2
pi
.
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Thus, the optimization problem in (41) is equivalent to
min
β,σ2p1 ,...,σ
2
pm
m∑
i=1
µ2i
σ2i + σ
2
pi
(42)
s.t. ‖β‖2 + tr(Σp) ≤ D
σ2pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}.
Since a non-zero β does not affect the objective function but result in positive distortion, the optimal
scheme satisfies β = (0, ..., 0). Furthermore, the Lagrangian of the above optimization problem is
given by
L(σ2p1 , ..., σ
2
pm , λ) =
m∑
i=1
µ2i
σ2i + σ
2
pi
+ λ0(
m∑
i=1
σ2pi −D)−
m∑
i=1
λiσ
2
pi , (43)
where λ = {λ0, ..., λm} denotes the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints. Taking
the derivatives of L(σ2p1 , ..., σ
2
pm , λ) with respect to σ
2
pi ,∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we have
∂L(σ2p1 , ..., σ
2
pm , λ)
∂σ2pi
= − µ
2
i
(σ2i + σ
2
pi)
2
+ λ0 − λi. (44)
Notice that the objective function in (41) is decreasing in σ2pi , ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}. Thus, the optimal
solution σ∗pi
2 satisfies
m∑
i=1
σ∗pi
2 = D. By the KKT conditions, we have
∂L(σ2p1 , ..., σ
2
pm , λ)
∂σ2pi
∣∣∣
σ2pi=σ
∗
pi
2,λ=λ∗
= − µ
2
i
(σ2i + σ
∗
pi
2)2
+ λ∗0 − λ∗i = 0. (45)
Since λ∗i , i ∈ {0, 1, ...,m} is dual feasible, we have λ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1, ...,m}. Therefore
λ∗0 ≥
µ2i
(σ2i + σ
∗
pi
2)2
.
If λ∗0 >
µ2i
σ4i
, we have λ∗0 >
µ2i
(σ2i+σ
∗
pi
2)2
. This implies λ∗i > 0. Thus, by complementary slackness,
σ∗pi
2 = 0. On the other hand, if λ∗0 <
µ2i
σ4i
, we have σ∗pi
2 > 0. Furthermore, by the complementary
slackness condition, λ∗iσ
∗
pi
2 = 0, ∀σ∗pi2. This implies λ∗i = 0, ∀σ∗pi2 > 0. As a result, for all σ∗pi2 > 0,
we have
|µi|√
λ∗0
= σ2i + σ
∗
pi
2. (46)
Therefore, σ∗pi
2 = max{ |µi|√
λ∗0
− σ2i , 0} =
(
|µi|√
λ∗0
− σ2i
)+
with
m∑
i=1
σ∗pi
2 = D. Substitute this optimal
solution into (10) with α =
√
(2µ)T (Σ + Σp)−12µ, we obtain the accuracy of the MAP adversary.
We observe that the when σ2i is greater than some threshold
|µi|√
λ∗0
, no noise is added to the data
on this dimension due to the high variance. When σ2i is smaller than
|µi|√
λ∗0
, the amount of noise
added to this dimension is proportional to |µi|; this is intuitive since a large |µi| indicates the two
conditionally Gaussian distributions are further away on this dimension, and thus, distinguishable.
Thus, more noise needs to be added in order to reduce the MAP adversary’s inference accuracy.
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D Mutual Information Estimation
Our GAP framework offers a scalable way to find a (local) equilibrium in the constrained min-max
optimization, under certain attacks (e.g. attacks based on a neural network). Yet the privatized
data, through our approach, should be immune to any general attacks and ultimately achieving the
goal of decreasing the correlation between the privatized data and the sensitive labels. Therefore
we use the estimated mutual information to certify that the sensitive data indeed is protected via
our framework.
We use the nearest k-th neighbor method[Kraskov et al., 2004] to estimate the entropy Hˆ given
by
Hˆ(Xˆ) = ψ(N)− ψ(k) + log(cd) + d
N
N∑
i=1
log ri (47)
where ri is the distance of the i-th sample xˆi to its k-th nearest neighbor, ψ is the digamma
function, cd = pi
d/2
Γ(1+d/2) in Euclidean norm, and N is the number of samples. Notice that Xˆ is
learned representation and S is the sensitive variable. Then, we calculate the mutual information
using Iˆ(Xˆ;S) = Hˆ(Xˆ)− Hˆ(Xˆ|S)
For a binary sensitive variable, we can simplify the empirical MI to
Iˆ(Xˆ;S) = Hˆ(Xˆ)− (P (S = 1)Hˆ(Xˆ|S = 1) + P (S = 0)Hˆ(Xˆ|S = 0)), (48)
where P (S = 1) and P (S = 0) can be approximated by the empirical probability.
One noteworthy difficulty is that Xˆ usually lives in high dimensions (e.g. each image has 256
dimensions in GENKI dataset) which is almost impossible to calculate the empirical entropy based
on raw data due to the sample complexity. Thus, we train a neural network that classifies the
sensitive variable from the learned data representation to reduce the dimension of the data. We
choose the layer before the softmax outputs (denoted by Xˆf ) to be the feature embedding that
has a much lower dimension than original Xˆ and also captures the information about the sensitive
variable. We use Xˆf as a surrogate of Xˆ for estimating the entropy. The resulting approximate MI
is
Iˆ(Xˆf ;S) = Hˆ(Xˆf )− Hˆ(Xˆf |S)
= Hˆ(Xˆf )−
(
P (S = 1)Hˆ(Xˆf |S = 1) + P (S = 0)Hˆ(Xˆf |S = 0)
)
.
Following the same manner, the MI between the learned representation Xˆ and the label Y is
approximated by Iˆ(Xˆf ;Y ), where Xˆf is the feature embedding that represents a privatized image
Xˆ.
For the GENKI dataset, we construct a CNN initialized by two conv blocks, then followed by
two fully connected (FC) layers, and lastly ended with two neurons having the softmax activations.
In each conv block, we have a convolution layer consisting of filters with the size equals 3×3 and the
stride equals 1, a 2× 2 max-pooling layer with the stride equals 2, and a ReLU activation function.
Those two conv blocks have 32 and 64 filters respectively. We flatten out the output of second conv
block yielding a 256 dimension vector. The extracted features from the second conv layers is passed
through the first FC layer with batch normalization and ReLU activation to get a 8-dimensional
vector, followed with the second FC layer to output a 2 dimensional vector that applied with the
softmax function. The aforementioned 8-dimensional vector is the feature embedding vector Xˆf in
our empirical MI estimation.
Estimating mutual information for HAR dataset has a slightly different challenge, as the size
of the alphabet for the sensitive label (i.e. identity) is 30. Thus, it requires at least 30 neurons
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prior to the output layer of the corresponding classification task. In fact we pose 128 neurons before
the final softmax output layer in order to get a reasonably good classification accuracy. Using
the 128-dimensional vector as our feature embedding to calculate mutual information is almost
impossible due to the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, we apply Principal Component Analysis
(PCA), shown in Figure 15, and pick the first 12 components to circumvent this issue. The resulting
12-dimensional vector is considered to be an approximate feature embedding that encapsulates the
major information of the processed data.
(a) Top 32 principal components out of the 561 features with
different distortion D
Figure 15: PCA for processed data in HAR
E Compute differential censoring risk for the Laplace and Gaussian
noise adding mechanisms
In the local differential privacy setting, we consider the value of each pixel as the output of the query
function. Since the pixel values of the GENKI dataset are normalized between 0 and 1, we can use
the dimension of the image to bound the sensitivities for both Laplace mechanism and Gaussian
mechanism. For the Laplace mechanism, let X and X ′ be two different image vectors. Since the
value of X and X ′ in each dimension is between 0 and 1, |Xi − X ′i| <= 1 for the ith dimension.
Thus, the L1 sensitivity can be bounded by the dimension of the image d. Notice that the variance
of the Laplace noise parameterized by λ is 2λ2. Since we are adding independent Laplace noise to
each pixel, given the per image distortion D, we have
D
d
= 2
d2
2
=⇒  = d
√
2d
D
.
Similarly, for the Gaussian mechanism, we can bound the L2 sensitivity by
√
d. For a fixed δ, the
privacy risk  for adding Gaussian noise with variance σ2 is given by
 = 2
√
d
σ
√
ln(
1.25
δ
).
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Since we are adding Gaussian noise independently to each pixel, the variance of the per pixel noise
in given by σ = Dd . As a result, we have
 = 2
d√
D
√
ln(
1.25
δ
).
F Details of Experiments
We train our models based on the data-driven GAP presented in Section 3 using TensorFlow [Abadi
et al., 2016].
F.1 GENKI Dataset
The GENKI dataset consists of 1, 740 training and 200 test samples. Each data sample is a 16× 16
greyscale face image with varying facial expressions. Both training and test datasets contain 50%
male and 50% female. Among each gender, we have 50% smile and 50% non-smile faces. We
consider gender as the sensitive variable S and the image pixels as non-sensitive variable X.
ARCHITECTURE. The FNND is modeled by a four-layer feedforward neural network. We first
reshape each image to a vector (256× 1), and then concatenate it with a 100× 1 Gaussian random
noise vector. Each entry in the noise vector is sampled independently from a standard Gaussian
distribution. We feed the entire vector to a four-layer fully connected (FC) neural network. Each
layer has 256 neurons with a leaky ReLU activation function. Finally, we reshape the output of the
last layer to a 16× 16 image.
To model the TCNND, we first generate a 100 × 1 Gaussian random vector and use a linear
projection to map the noise vector to a 4× 4× 256 feature tensor. The feature tensor is then fed to
an initial transposed convolution layer (DeCONV) with 128 filters (filter size 3× 3, stride 2) and a
ReLU activation, followed by another DeCONV layer with 1 filter (filter size 3× 3, stride 2) and a
tanh activation. The output of the DeCONV layer is added to the original image to generate the
processed data. For both decorrelators, we add batch normalization [Ioffe and Szegedy, 2015] on
each hidden layer to prevent covariance shift and help gradients to flow. We model the adversary
using convolutional neural networks (CNNs). This architecture outperforms most of other models
for image classification [Krizhevsky et al., 2012, Szegedy et al., 2015].
Figure 18 illustrates the architecture of the adversary. The processed images are fed to two
convolution layers (CONV) whose sizes are 3×3×32 and 3×3×64, respectively. Each convolution
layer is followed by ReLU activation and batch normalization. The output of each convolution
layer is fed to a 2 × 2 maxpool layer (POOL) to extract features for classification. The second
maxpool layer is followed by two fully connected layers, each contains 1024 neurons with a batch
normalization and a ReLU activation. Finally, the output of the last fully connected layer is mapped
to the output layer, which contains two neurons capturing the belief of the subject being a male or
a female.
F.2 HAR Dataset
The HAR dataset consists of 561 features of motion sensor data collected by a smartphone from 30
subjects performing six activities (walking, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, sitting, standing,
laying). We choose subject identity as sensitive variable S and features of motion sensor data as
public variable X. The dataset is randomly partitioned into 8, 000 training and 2, 299 test samples.
ARCHITECTURE. We first concatenate the original data with a 100 × 1 Gaussian random
noise vector. We then feed the entire 661 × 1 vector to a Feed Forward neural network with
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Figure 16: Feedforward neural network decorrelator
Figure 17: Transposed convolution neural network decorrelator
three hidden fully connected (FC) layers. Each hidden layer has 512 neurons with a leaky ReLU
activation. Finally, we use another FC layer with 561 neurons to generate the processed data. For
the adversary, we use a five-layer feedforward neural network. The hidden layers have 512, 512, 256,
and 128 neurons with leaky ReLU activation, respectively. The output of the last hidden layer is
mapped to the output layer, which contains 30 neurons capturing the belief of the subject’s identity.
For both decorrelator and adversary, we add a batch normalization after the output of each hidden
layer.
F.3 UCI Adult
The UCI Adult dataset consists of 32, 561 training and 16, 282 testing samples. Each sample has
both continuous and categorical features. Table 5 lists all the considered features. We perform
an onehot encoding on each categorical feature in (S,X) and store the mapping function from the
onehot encoding to the categorical data. For the continuous features in X, we restrict them into
the interval (0, 1) by normalization.
ARCHITECTURE. For the UCI Adult dataset, the used architectures are shown in Fig. 19. We
concatenate the pre-processed data with a same size standard Gaussian random vector, and feed
the entire vector to the encoder. The encoder consists of two full-connected (FC) hidden layers
with the number of neurons as 170 and 130, respectively. Since the output representation Xr has
the same dimension as the feature variable X, the output layer of the encoder has 113 (as shown
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Figure 18: Convolutional neural network adversary
(a) The Architecture for Case I. (b) The Architecture for Case II.
Figure 19: The Architectures of the encoder and adversary for the UCI Adult dataset. Note that the
appended noise has the same size of the input features and the output of the encoder has the same
dimension as the feature variable X. Therefore, in Fig. 19a, for only taking X into the encoder,
the length of the input vector is 226 and for taking both X and the binary S, it is 230. For both
scenarios, the length of the encoder’s output is 113. In Fig. 19b, the relationship belongs to the
sensitive variable, and therefore, the length of the encoder’s output is 107.
in Fig. 19a) and 107 (as shown in Fig. 19b) neurons for Case I and Case II, respectively. We use a
leaky Rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function in the encoder.
For Case I, the adversarial classifier in Fig. 19a consists of three full-connected (FC) layers with
the number of neurons as 10, 5 as well as 2, respectively, and it takes Xr as the input and outputs
a belief distribution for the binary sensitive variable S (i.e., gender). Here a ReLU is used as the
activation function in the two hidden layers and the soft-max is used in the output layer to generate
a belief distribution for gender. The same architecture is used for the downstream application of
salary classification. For Case II, the adversarial classifier in Fig. 19b consists of three full-connected
(FC) layers with the number of neurons as 50, 30 as well as 12, respectively. Here a Leaky ReLU is
used as the activation function in the two hidden layers and the soft-max is used in the output layer.
All of the above models use log-loss as the loss function and are optimized by a Adam optimizer.
F.4 UTKFace Dataset
The UTKFace dataset consists of more than 20 thousand 200 × 200 colorful face images labeled
by age, ethnicity and gender. Individuals in the dataset have ages from 0 to 116 year old and are
divided into 5 ethnicities: White, Black, Asian, Indian, and Others including Hispanic, Latino and
Middle Eastern. We take gender as the sensitive information and take both age and ethnicity as
the target information for two downstream applications: age regression and (non-binary) ethnicity
classification, respectively. We reshape images as size 64× 64 and use 16830 samples with age from
10 to 65 and ethnicity as white, black, Asian or India, 80% of which, i.e., 13464 samples, are used
for training.
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ARCHITECTURE. For the UTKFace dataset, the used architectures are shown in Figs. 20, 21
and 22. Fig. 20 gives the architecture of GAP which consists of an encoder and an adversarial
classifier. The encoder is implemented by a noisy auto-encoder whose encoder transforms the
original 64 × 64 RGB-images to a 4096-dimensional feature vector. Different from standard auto-
encoder, which directly feeds the feature vector into the encoder part. Here, the feature vector is
mixed with a 4096-dimensional standard normal random vector4, and then, fed into a decoder to
reconstruct a 64× 64 colorful image, which is the GAP representation Xr. Specifically, the encoder
part of the autoencoder consists of 4 convolution layers with 128, 64, 64 and 64 output channels,
respectively, and 3 2 × 2-max pooling layers following the first 3 convolution layers. The encoder
part is followed by 2 fully-connected layers with 4096 neurons which mixes the noise and the output
feature vector. The following decoder part consists of 5 convolution layers with 64, 64, 64, 128 and 3
output channels, respectively, and 3 2×2-up-sampling layers following the first 3 convolution layers.
The adversarial classifier takes into the GAP representation Xr and outputs the prediction of the
sensitive information gender. It consists of 2 convolution layers with 20 and 40 output channels,
respectively, 2 2×2-max pooling layers following each of the convolution layers and 2 full-connected
layers with 40 and 2 neurons, respectively. The size of kernels in convolution layers is 3 × 3. All
convolution and full-connected layers use ReLU as the activation function except the last layers
of the decoder and the adversarial which use sigmoid and softmax, respectively. The encoder and
adversarial classifier use the square-loss and log-loss as the loss functions, respectively, and both of
them are optimized by Adam Optimizer.
Fig. 21 gives the architecture of the downstream non-binary classification for ethnicity. The classifier
is built by replacing the top (last) 3 fully-connected layers of the VGG 16 model5 pre-trained on
ImageNet with two fully-connect layers. The first one layer has 256 neurons with ReLU as the
activation function and is followed by a Dropout layer with the rate 0.5, and the second one has
4 neurons with softmax as the activation function. The classifier use log-loss and is optimized by
a Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer. Fig. 22 shows the architecture for the the downstream
application of age regression. The regressor consists of three 3× 3 convolution layers with 128, 64
and 32 output channels, three 2×2-max pooling layers following each of the convolution layers, and
three fully-connected layers with 512, 128 and 1 neurons, respectively. All layers use ReLU as the
activation function except the last layer which uses a linear activation. The model uses the squared
loss as the loss function and is optimized by a Adam Optimizer.
Figure 20: The Architectures of the encoder and adversary for the UTKFace dataset
4A random vector is a standard normal random vector if all of its components are independent and identically
following the standard normal distribution.
5https://keras.io/applications/#vgg16
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Figure 21: The Architecture of the neural network for ethnicity classification.
Figure 22: The Architecture of the neural network for age regression.
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Algorithm 1 Alternating minimax censoring preserving algorithm
Input: dataset D, distortion parameter D, iteration number T
Output: Optimal generative decorrelator parameter θp
procedure Alernate Minimax(D, D, T )
Initialize θ1p and θ1a
for t = 1, ..., T do
Random minibatch of M datapoints {x(1), ..., x(M)} drawn from full dataset
Generate {xˆ(1), ..., xˆ(M)} via xˆ(i) = g(x(i), s(i); θtp)
Update the adversary parameter θt+1a by stochastic gradient ascend for j epochs
θt+1a = θ
t
a + αt∇θta
1
M
M∑
i=1
−`(h(xˆ(i); θta), s(i)), αt > 0
Compute the descent direction ∇θtp l(θtp, θt+1a ), where
`(θtp, θ
t+1
a ) = −
1
M
M∑
i=1
`(h(g(x(i), s(i); θ
t
p); θ
t+1
a ), s(i))
subject to 1M
∑M
i=1[d(g(x(i), s(i); θ
t
p), x(i))] ≤ D
Perform line search along ∇θtp l(θtp, θt+1a ) and update
θt+1p = θ
t
p − αt∇θtp`(θtp, θt+1a )
Exit if solution converged
return θt+1p
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